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Abstract
This paper aims at giving an account of the philosophy of norms of Georges Can-
guilhem in the framework of his philosophical vitalism. According to Canguilhem, 
vitalism is not a metaphysical or ontological theory, but rather a general attitude or a 
perspective about life and living beings, both understood employing the axiological 
concept of ‘normativity’. This notion allows Canguilhem to enlarge the concept of 
life beyond the field of biological phenomena, encompassing also phenomena of the 
social world, included technique and scientific knowledge and rationality. Canguil-
hem’s perspective relocates human activities within a vitalistic conception of life, 
which redefines the meaning of human reason by putting it in relation to values and 
norms.
This paper aims at giving an account of the philosophy of norms of Georges Can-
guilhem in the framework of his philosophical vitalism. Canguilhem develops his 
normative philosophy within a framework analysis that takes into account the philo-
sophical meaning of the biological and medical concept of ‘norm’. Nevertheless, his 
work cannot be confined to the narrow field of philosophy of medicine and biology, 
but aims at providing a wider and more comprehensive perspective, able to provide 
a philosophical account for more complex aspects of human life, such as knowledge, 
rationality, and social behaviours.
Even if Canguilhem avoids any reductionist viewpoint, his concepts of vital 
norms and normativity allow him to interpret human phenomena within a general 
philosophical approach that has been identified as ‘vitalism’. As it is shown by the 
first part of this paper (Sects. 1 and 2), this kind of vitalism is quite different from 
the modern biological theories usually identified by this label, because it relies on 
a theory of values that provides the basis for his interpretation of life in terms of 
‘normativity’ (Sect. 3). This last concept allows Canguilhem to enlarge the concept 
of life beyond the field of biology and to interpret vitalism as a general philosophy, 
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able to take into account typical human and social phenomena, through a specific 
idea of rationality that explicitly relates to values and norms (Sect. 4). For this rea-
son, to be a human being means to be a special kind of living being, the one able to 
reason on values and norms.
1  What Kind of Vitalism?
The conceptual label ‘vitalism’ has been used in the modern history of ideas to 
denote several different scientific, metaphysical, or religious theories and beliefs 
concerning the status of living beings and life phenomena within the physical unani-
mated world.1 The French philosopher André Lalande wrote, in his Vocabulaire 
technique et critique de la philosophie (1927), that the most general meaning of the 
word ‘vitalism’ refers to each doctrine or conviction that claims for a radical differ-
ence between phenomena concerning life and all other natural (physical or chemi-
cal) facts [24]. According to this definition, vitalism often includes (or is associated 
with) other controversial beliefs, such as psychological and metaphysical theories 
about the origin of the mind or even animism, intended as a belief in the common 
origin of life and soul [24].
Since the nineteenth century, a tradition in the history of life sciences pointed out 
vitalism as an irrational belief and even as an obstacle to the rise and the develop-
ment of modern scientific biology and medicine. For example, the scientist Emil 
Du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896) stated, in a speech dedicated to the memory of his 
former professor Johannes Müller (1801–1858), that vitalism played no positive role 
in the development of the muscular physiology [20: 135–317]. In so doing, Du Bois-
Reymond was failing to take into account the merits of relevant scholars (or at least 
he was underestimating their work), such as Georg Prochaska (1749–1820), a pio-
neer of the modern psychological theory of reflexes [12: 139]. Although they were 
convinced to propose a sort of neutral and positivistic history of science, these schol-
ars forged their historical narrative on an implicit philosophical assumption, identi-
fying the essence of modern scientific reason with a specific philosophical position: 
mechanism [12: 158]. Furthermore, the negative account of the role of vitalism has 
been criticized and revised in the first half of the twentieth century by historians and 
philosophers of science interested in highlighting its positive role in the develop-
ment of life sciences [11, 12]. Additionally, recent studies are pointing out the com-
plex and multi-layered history of vitalism, trying to bring order in a composed set of 
different theories, which is difficult to consider as a whole. Within this framework of 
studies, a very simple but effective taxonomy, proposed by Charles T. Wolfe, identi-
fies three main versions of vitalism [45–47]:
a. A Substantival or Metaphysical Vitalism, which supposes the existence of 
a living matter (a substance or a force) that is independent of the physical and 
1 For a recent, up-to-date history of vitalism in Modern and Contemporary Age, see Wolfe [45].
1021
1 3
Reasoning in Life: Values and Normativity in Georges Canguilhem 
chemical laws of inorganic matter.2 This kind of vitalism often connects to 
other metaphysical arguments, such as psychological animism [24], and has 
strong implications for life sciences. An example of this kind of vitalism is the 
definition of life as “entelechy” [Entelechie] provided by Hans Driesch (1867–
1941), especially in his philosophical works Der Vitalismus als Geschichte 
und als Lehre (1905) and then vulgarized in a series of Gifford Lectures in 
1907–1908 [18, 19]. The notion of Entelechie and Driesch’s vitalism has been 
the object of a well-known condemnation by some members of the Wiener 
Kreis, such as Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) and Philipp Frank (1884–1966) 
[45: 356].3
b. A Structural–functional Vitalism, which does not imply the existence of a 
specific “living matter” or “vital force” and considers living beings as complex 
phenomena with specific emergent features, different from those regulating 
inorganic phenomena, claiming a specific viewpoint for the phenomena related 
to living beings [48, 49]. An eminent example of this vitalism is provided by 
some representatives of the so-called “École médicale de Montpellier”, such 
as Théofile de Bordeu (1722–1776) or Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734–1806) [48, 
49].
c. An Existential or Attitudinal Vitalism, which realises that there is a pecu-
liar attitude of a living being towards other living subjects [49]. This specific 
version of vitalism does not necessarily imply any particular position on the 
contents of scientific knowledge about life but involves some general conse-
quences at an epistemological level. Examples of this last version of vitalism 
can be found in the work of the German psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein (1878–
1965) [23] and of the French philosopher and historian of science Georges 
Canguilhem (1904–1995), which is the main subject of this article.4
Attitudinal vitalism developed by Georges Canguilhem has been widely analysed 
by scholars from different perspectives, and they have emphasized its connexions to 
other sections of Canguilhem’s work: his philosophy of medicine, his work in the 
history of science [38], his philosophy of techniques [14]. Otherwise, Canguilhem’s 
vitalism has been also interpreted as a general philosophical programme, a sort of 
fil rouge that allows the interpreter to keep an encompassing outlook on his philo-
sophical production [15, 42]. These two different interpretative approaches are not 
mutually excluding, but they can reinforce themselves as long as they provide a gen-
eral interpretive structure that can integrate all of Canguilhem’s philosophical work. 
2 It is important to note that even though this metaphysical vitalism involves concepts like anima or 
entelechia it is not necessarily incompatible with a materialistic point of view. On the contrary, it is pos-
sible to trace a history of the emergence of “vital materialism” in modern age [46].
3 The concept of Entelechie has been later criticized also because of the controversial ‘political’ meaning 
Driesch gave to it during the 1930 s [45: 409].
4 About the relationship between Goldstein’s philosophy of the organism and Canguilhem’s vitalism, 
especially about the issues discussed in this article, see Wolfe [47] and Moya Diez [33]. Another ‘bench-
mark philosophy’ for Canguilhem’s project of ‘biophilosophy’ is Bergsonism. For some considerations 
about the relationship between Canguilhem, Henri Bergson (1859–1941), and Gilles Deleuze (1925–
1995), who resumed the Bergsonian legacy during the 1960s–1970s, please see [2, 50].
1022 G. Vissio 
1 3
Traditionally, several scholars have considered the theory of norms and normativity 
as an element of continuity in Canguilhem’s work [26, 32, 35], also arguing that the 
notion of “norm” would play a meta-level role in the theoretical scaffolding of his 
philosophy [35]. This position appears to match with a valorisation of vitalism since 
notions of “norm” and “normativity” are core concepts of Canguilhem’s inquiry on 
health and disease [13].
2  Values Beyond Vitalism
Until the mid-1990s, Canguilhem was generally known as an accurate and erudite 
historian of the modern life sciences—especially biology and medicine—and for 
his masterpiece in the field of philosophy of medicine, his 1943 thesis Essai sur 
quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologique, lately known, after 
some integrations in 1966, as Le normal et le pathologique. His writings were 
renowned in a group of experts in these fields, but his influence in the French philo-
sophical culture grew after World War II. In 1994 François Delaporte, a disciple of 
Michel Foucault (1926–1984) at the Collège de France during the 1970s, edited a 
collection of essays and texts by Georges Canguilhem with an important Preface 
written by the American anthropologist Paul Rabinow and a Critical Bibliography 
by Camille Limoges [17, 28]. This bibliography inaugurated a new season for the 
reception of Canguilhem in the contemporary philosophical culture, and not just 
because the book was an anthological introduction to his philosophical work. In fact, 
Limoges entered the list of the several less-known writings Canguilhem wrote dur-
ing his long career, including an impressive number of texts dating to the 1920s and 
1930s. A ‘new’ Canguilhem appeared [3–5], revealing a multifaceted and fascinat-
ing landscape of intellectual and cultural references encompassing the Bildung of 
this young philosopher during the 1920s [39, 40] and the emergence of his vitalism 
between the late 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s [1, 2].5
In this multifaceted scene, one of the most prominent figures is represented by 
the French professor and writer Émile Chartier (1868–1951), mostly known under 
his penname “Alain”. Chartier played the role of an influential intellectual leader 
for at least two generations of young thinkers, philosophers, and writers during the 
first decades of the twentieth century [41]. Professor of philosophy at the prestigious 
Lycée Henri-IV in the Quartier Latin in Paris, this eclectic thinker was a mentor for 
intellectual personalities like Michel Alexandre (1888–1952) and his wife Jeanne 
Halbwachs (1890–1980), Simone Weil (1909–1943), Raymond Aron (1905–1983), 
among the others. In his distinguished book about the “intellectual generation” 
born around 1905, François Sirinelli dedicated several pages to Alain and his pupils 
5 For a general presentation of the development of Canguilhem’s philosophy see the work of François 
Dagognet [16] and the introductive book by Lecourt [25]. A general presentation of the impact of the 
Œuvres Complètes in the current debate on Canguilhem’s philosophy is provided by a recent book by 
Stuart Elden [21: 10–13].
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[41, 42], emphasizing the role of Chartier as a “professeur éveilleur”.6 Canguilhem 
was one of the beloved disciples of Alain and he probably was, at least until the 
mid-1930s, his favourite pupil. He was deeply involved in Chartier’s journal Libres 
Propos, and he took part in different querelles defending Alain’s radical pacifism 
against militarism, but also against different positions in the anti-militarist spectrum.
The political debate after World War I was the framework in which Canguilhem 
articulated a philosophy of values, which set the basis for his further philosophical 
inquiries [34]. According to the young Canguilhem, words like ‘war’ and ‘peace’ do 
not denote facts or factual situations, but a couple of opposing values. In this sense, 
the Versailles Treaty (1919) claimed to establish peace in Europe as a fact, but under 
the surface, the war was surviving as a value spreading in society. The compulsory 
military service, the rhetoric of the winners and the losers, and the general militari-
zation of the civil society [7–9], are just some of the indicators of the permanence 
of the war in peacetime. The militarist rhetoric depicts the world as a neutral reality, 
but it is designing society according to specific axiology. According to Canguilhem, 
even the perception of space and time [6, 10] is socially shaped by the general mili-
tarization of society.
More in general, the young Canguilhem was establishing an opposition between 
the notions of fact and value that would have gained great importance in the forth-
coming developments of his philosophy. In particular, between the late 1930s and 
middle of the 1940s, Canguilhem developed a general philosophy grounded on the 
notion of value, integrating two other key concepts: norm and life.
3  Vital Norms
In his masterpiece Essai sur quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le 
pathologique (1943), Canguilhem proposes to consider life as the ability of the liv-
ing beings to “judge” elements of their environment or “milieu”, attributing them 
positive or negative values. In fact, according to Canguilhem:
Even for an amoeba, living means preference and exclusion. A digestive tract, 
sexual organs, constitute an organism’s behavioural norms. Psychoanalytic 
language – states Canguilhem – is indeed right to give the name poles to the 
natural orifices of ingestion and excretion. […] There is a dynamic polarity of 
life [13: 136].
Canguilhem better defines the previous theory of values in the 1943 book, which 
attributes a ‘polarised’ constitution of reality to values. Furthermore, the notions of 
subject and subjectivity are now enlarged thanks to the introduction of the concept 
of the living being, which allows a wider and more general extension of the theory of 
6 Despite this image of an inspiring mentor, after the World War II and the political experience of Vichy, 
which involved some of his disciples, Alain and his philosophy were subject of violent controversies, 
because of the supposed role his radical pacifism played in providing a cultural and political élite pre-
pared to accept collaboration to the Nazi regime [42].
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values beyond the field of the human experience. The Kantian influence of Chartier 
persists beside a positive reassessment of the philosophy of Henri Bergson7—who 
has previously been the subject of criticism by Canguilhem—and critical reception 
of some results of the biological and medical philosophical inquiries. In this context, 
“value” loses its human and moral connotation and becomes a biological concept 
with a general philosophical meaning. According to Canguilhem, “We can say of 
the universe of every living thing what Reininger says of the universe of man: […] 
our image of the world is always a display of values as well” [13: 179].
This general reconsideration of the idea of value and its new arranging in a bio-
logical framework goes along with the introduction of the concepts of ‘norm’ and 
‘normativity’ at the very heart of the philosophy of Canguilhem. In the 1943 work, 
Canguilhem states that “Normative, in philosophy, means every judgment which 
evaluates or qualifies a fact in relation to a norm, but this mode of judgment is 
essentially subordinate to that which establishes norms” [13: 126]. Norms are refer-
ences for evaluations of factual reality and they constitute criteria for value assign-
ments. Usually, norms are conceived as a matter concerning the human and social 
world, but in this case “we do not ascribe a human content to vital norms but we do 
ask ourselves how normativity essential to human consciousness would be explained 
if it did not in some way exist in embryo in life” [13: 127]. In his essay, Canguil-
hem takes into account the problem of the meaning of health, disease, and cure, for 
which he provides normative definitions. There are a social meaning and a specific 
human way to conceive vital conditions like health, disease, and cure, but these lasts 
should find their foundation in biological life:
From the sociological point of view, it can be shown that therapeutics was first 
a religious, magical activity, but this does not negate the fact that therapeutic 
need is a vital need, which, even in lower living organisms arouses reactions of 
hedonic value or self-healing or self-restoring behaviours [13: 127].
In this sense, the establishment of vital norms and the consequently polarised evalu-
ation of the surrounding environment (milieu) is a typical activity of living beings, 
well expressed by the pathological condition, which exists only for the living: “Bio-
logical pathology exists but there is no physical or chemical or mechanical pathol-
ogy” [13: 127].
The crucial experience of disease allows Canguilhem to introduce the notion of 
normativity, one of the most original contributions of his work. If to be alive means 
to establish norms and evaluate a milieu, to be sick is defined as a change in the 
vital norms of the individual [36]. On this point, the influence of the neurologist and 
psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965) is explicit and clear: he stated that “disease 
appears when an organism is changed in such a way that, though in its proper, ‘nor-
mal’ milieu, it suffers catastrophic reaction” [13: 185].8 “A living being is normal” 
8 Quoted by Canguilhem.
7 There is actually no mention of Bergson in the Essai, but we can find a reconsideration of Bergsonism 
in some text of the same years that are deeply connected to the development of Canguilhem’s normative 
philosophy of life [1].
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Canguilhem states “in any given environment insofar as it is the morphological and 
functional solution found by life as a response to the demands of the environment” 
[13: 144]. Vital norms are established regimes of life the organism finds by bargain-
ing with his milieu and disease is the change of this relationship between the bio-
logical individual and the surrounding environment. Nevertheless, a change is not 
a vanishing: the pathological status is still a living condition, even if an undesirable 
and unfortunate one, and to be alive means to establish vital norms. In this sense, 
the sick individual is not devoid of any sort of norms, but it finds itself confined and 
reduced in its capacity to change these norms. To be sick implies to live in a milieu 
in which I am not able to do certain kinds of things (e.g. I cannot eat a certain food 
or I cannot do certain physical works, because of a disease or an injury): sickness 
is a restriction and a limitation of the ability to interact with the surrounding milieu 
and, precisely because of this, it can be described as a state of restricted ability to 
negotiate norms with the environment.9
Canguilhem calls this ability or capacity to redefine vital norms “normativity” 
[13: 227]. This concept expresses the active and effective role the living being plays 
in the relationship with the environment. There is not a unilateral influence of the 
surrounding environment that mechanically defines the vital norms of the organism, 
but the organism itself (even the sick organism) can structure the normative relation-
ship with its milieu.
If biological norms exist it is because life, as not only subject to the environ-
ment but also as an institution of its environment, thereby posits values not 
only in the environment but also in the organism itself. This is what we call 
biological normativity [13: 227].
Even if the term «vitalism» does not appear in the Essai for defining his philosophi-
cal position, the vitalistic position he would then elaborate from the 1950s relies 
essentially on the definition of life as normativity and on the idea that living is a 
form of evaluation.10 Especially, in La connaissance de la vie (1952) and La forma-
tion du concept de reflèxe aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles (1955) and in some other 
minor writings of that period, Canguilhem began to mature his critical revision of 
the vitalistic tradition and to develop vitalism as a general philosophical proposal.11 
This new interest in vitalism did not mean a decrease of interest in the problem 
of normativity in life and vital norms but on the contrary, a strong integration of 
this inquiry within a new research framework. The presence of three entire chap-
ters on Le vivant et son milieu, Le normal et le pathologique, La monstruosité et le 
9 Nowadays, normativism is one of the fundamental theoretical options in the debate on definitions of 
“health”, “sickness”, “illness” and “disease” in philosophy. About the position of Canguilhem’s defini-
tions of “norm” and “normativity”, the main bibliographical reference is the book by Élodie Giroux [22]. 
On this topic see also the articles by Lingua [30] and Pilotto [37].
10 In this sense, some scholars have explicitly identified Canguilhem’s concept of illness with a vitalistic 
perspective [36] and underlined its connection to his theory of values [44].
11 Camille Limoges has drawn attention to the project of a philosophie biologique Canguilhem devel-
oped starting from the 1950s [29] and Charles Wolfe and Andy Wong have interpreted Canguilhem’s 
project of a biophilosophy as a «return to vitalism» [50]. On this point see also the article by Vissio [43].
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monstrueux in the third section of La connaissance de la vie that opened with one of 
his most important contribution on vitalism (Aspects du vitalisme) is the proof that 
this two research interests were anything but separated [11].
4  Beyond Biology: Human Life Between Social Norms 
and Rationality
If the definition of life in terms of normativity and polarisation of values allows 
Canguilhem to ground any human activity as a response to a vital need posed by the 
relationship between the individual and its milieu, it also requires an enlarged con-
ception of life capable to give an account of vital norms beyond strictly biological 
explanations.
Nevertheless, Canguilhem seems to be aware of some risks connected to this all-
embracing vitalistic position. In a three chapter-long addendum to the 1943 thesis 
in medicine—the so-called Nouvelles réflexions sur le normal et le pathologique 
(1966)—Canguilhem explicitly takes into account the relationship between social 
and vital norms, pointing out the risk in those philosophical perspectives that 
conceive society and social norms based on an organic model [13: 250]. Criticiz-
ing social models based on the analogy between society and organic body (e.g. the 
Comtian theory of social boundary as a “consensus”) Canguilhem argues that social 
norms are essentially different from biological ones [13: 250]. A biological norm 
emerges simultaneously to the correspondent biological need, whereas social norms 
are the result of a confrontation between different social interests and needs [13: 
256]. For instance, the urge to feed is necessarily connected to the presence of a 
digestive system and a nutritional strategy: “in the case of the organism the fact of 
need expresses the existence of a regulatory apparatus” [13: 252] and this occurs 
because of a biological need that
has as its center the organism taken in its entirety, even though it manifests 
itself and is satisfied by means of one apparatus, so its regulation expresses the 
integration of parts within the whole though it operates by means of one nerv-
ous and endocrine system [13: 253].
Conversely, even if society mimics organic life, social needs do not immediately find 
their solution in a regulatory apparatus that is already part of the same organic body. 
For this reason, the infringement of a social norm or rule is different from sickness 
and there is not a social pathology or illness. Actually, “If social norms could be per-
ceived as clearly as organic norms, men would be mad not to conform to them. As 
men are not mad […] social norms are to be invented and not observed” [13: 259].
Moreover, Canguilhem argues that “the form and functions of the human body 
are the expression not only of conditions imposed on life by the environment but 
also of socially adopted modes of living in the environment” [13: 269]. Human 
beings live in-between two normative orders, which are distinct but not completely 
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independent.12 Moreover, there is a single, integrate normative sphere, in which 
social norms are modes of living in the environment developed by human beings 
that are also components of the same human–environment. Even if any form of bio-
logical reductionism and environmental determinism is excluded, even if social life 
is conceived as relatively autonomous, social norms respond to a vital need as well.
According to this, in Aspects du vitalisme, Canguilhem promoted the idea that 
every human behaviour, knowledge, and science included, must be considered as an 
answer given by a special living being to a vital exigency and vitalism itself «trans-
lates a permanent exigency of life», which is precisely the necessity to recognise life 
as the condition of possibility of every kind of human activity [11: 62]. In this sense, 
even the knowledge of life and its emergence in a material inanimate world, would 
not have been possible without a living being conceiving that world as an object of 
interest:
The milieu in which one looks for the emergence of life only acquires its 
meaning in virtue of the operation of the human living being who takes meas-
urements of it, measurements that bear an essential relation to the technical 
apparatuses and procedures by which they are made [11: 70].
In this viewpoint, Canguilhem’s vitalism does not aim to explain life as an imperium 
in imperio but rather proposes a monist perspective in which every human relation-
ship with the world can be expressed as an answer to a vital exigency: «If one is 
to assert the originality of the biological, this must be in terms of the originality 
of one realm over the whole of experience, and not over islets of experience» [11: 
70]. In this sense, Canguilhem’s vitalism is a reaction to those philosophical per-
spectives arguing for a strict opposition between life and scientific reason. Bergson’s 
philosophy, for example, claimed for the impossibility of modern science to reach 
an authentic knowledge of life, because of the analytical and ‘geometrical’ form of 
scientific intelligence, which he opposes to the philosophical method of intuition; 
through his philosophical vitalism, Canguilhem aims instead at leading back into 
unity science and life, retracing in vital normativity the basis of both scientific and 
social reasoning [35].
5  Conclusions
In conclusion, Canguilhem’s vitalism aims at giving an account of typical human 
activities like knowledge and science grounded in a normative philosophy of life. 
This allows Canguilhem to fully include human activities and behaviors in a gen-
eral conception of living phenomena, actually encompassing human life in the 
‘natural’ world. This inclusion takes out any temptation to reintroduce an opposi-
tion between life and the instrument that makes it possible the knowledge of life 
12 According to this perspective, some scholars have tried to propose a philosophical anthropology based 
on Canguilhem’s notion of norm and normativity. An eminent example of this kind of attempts are the 
works by Guillaume Le Blanc [27].
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itself, namely scientific reason. Through the notion of vital normativity, Canguil-
hem qualifies life as a domain of values, characterizing human beings as subjects 
acting in a milieu woven of axiological meanings. In biological life, values are 
not arbitrarily imposed on the milieu by an absolute subjectivity, but they emerge 
in a ‘debate’ between the living being and its environment. In a not contradic-
tory, but still different manner, human and social values arise as the product of 
a special sort of ‘debate’, the one elapsing between distinct parts of the social 
body. Even though there is no biological obligation, the rational feature of human 
normativity allows societies to arrange this debate in the form of a confrontation 
between different exigencies and needs, but also provides to every human subject 
the possibility to challenge regimes of injustice, claiming for a different order of 
values.
Therefore, Canguilhem’s philosophical investigation is not confined to the 
narrow field of philosophy of biology and life sciences, but it could be consid-
ered as a general philosophical perspective with important implications for social 
and cultural sciences. In particular, the description of life as a normative activ-
ity could provide sound grounds for the analysis of values and norms as part of 
the semiotics of culture. To assume this philosophical perspective, for example, 
could help us to avoid the idea of meaning production as a neutral activity hap-
pening in an empty, blank space: on the contrary, semiosphere, intended as the 
“semiotic space, outside of which semiosis itself cannot exist” [31], should be 
considered as a tissue of values and axiological polarities. Moreover, according 
to Lotman, semiospheres are “simultaneously both participant in the dialogue (as 
part of the semiosphere) and the space of dialogue (the semiosphere as a whole)” 
[31], a definition that seems to combine well with the Canguilhem’s concept of 
“milieu”. In this sense, a further and in-depth examination of the semiotic impli-
cations of Canguilhem’s thought and of philosophical vitalism is an open line of 
research, which might provide a sound, original philosophical ground for ensur-
ing the development of semiotic theory and its conceptual tools.
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